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Government Intervention in International Technology Transfer:
More or Less?
by D.G. McFetridge*
I. INTRODUCTION
Governments intervene in the international technology transfer process
in a variety of ways. Intervention may involve some or all of:
- alteration of the scope and magnitude of domestic intellectual
property rights;
- participation in the negotiation of international technology
transfer arrangements;
- subsidization of technology acquisition and complementary
activities;
- alteration of the competitive environment by changing trade
policy or other means.
This paper examines the types of intervention in which the govern-
ments of Canada and other countries have engaged. Policies relating to
intellectual property are discussed in Section II. Intervention in the tech-
nology transfer process itself is examined in Section III. The subsidiza-
tion of technology transfer and related activities is the subject of Section
IV. A brief discussion of the role of trade policy appears in Section V
and Section VI contains some concluding observations.
The principal finding of this paper is that international criticism of
compulsory licensing and the Foreign Investment Review Agency
notwithstanding, Canadian intervention in the process of international
technology transfer has not been extensive by international standards.
Moreover, the form of this intervention appears to have shifted from a
focus on individual technology transfers to an emphasis on the mainte-
nance of a general competitive environment conducive to technology
transfer. This shift of emphasis should be continued.
II. THE ALTERATION OF DOMESTIC INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS
Some technology importing countries have attempted to improve
the terms upon which they are able to acquire technology from abroad by
reducing the scope and duration of intellectual property rights. Among
the means by which this is achieved are limiting the use of so-called re-
* Professor, Department of Economics, Carleton University (Ottawa, Canada).
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strictive clauses in license agreements, and providing for compulsory
licenses at concessionary royalty rates.
The UNCTAD Code, upon which the national technology transfer
laws of a number of less developed countries have been based, prohibits a
wide variety of restrictive (from the licensee's point of view) clauses in
license agreements.I Among the clauses prohibited are:
- Restrictions on field of use;
- Restrictions on the acquisition and use of competing technolo-
gies (tie-outs);
- Tie-ins which oblige the licensee to purchase specified inputs
from the licensor;
- Volume restrictions;
- Territorial and distributional restrictions;
- Grantbacks which give the licensor the right to make use of the
licensee's improvements in the technology.
Canadian patent and competition law imposes fewer limitations on
the rights of the licensor than is the case in most countries. In their
recent assessment of Canadian law relating to technology transfer,
Palmer and Aiello concluded that: The law in Canada permits in general
any sort of restrictive provision in a license except resale price
maintenance.2
Restrictive clauses which have the effect of extending the patent mo-
nopoly beyond its intended scope and duration might be held to contra-
vene § 29 of the Combines Investigation Act.3 Under this section the
Federal Court can declare void any patent or license which lessens com-
petition unduly and in a manner not contemplated in the international
conventions to which Canada adheres.
There are only two § 29 cases in the public record. They are related
and both were settled before they reached trial. The first involved
licenses granted by Union Carbide for the production of a patented poly-
ethylene film. The Director of Investigation alleged that two provisions
of these licenses were in violation of § 29. The first required that licen-
sees pay a higher royalty to Union Carbide in lieu of purchasing an un-
patented domestically produced resin from Union Carbide as a raw
material in the production of the patented film. The second involved the
continuation of the restrictions imposed on the licensees by Union Car-
bide after the expiry of the underlying patents. Under the terms of the
settlement Union Carbide eliminated the tying arrangement and under-
took to provide royalty-free licenses (two of the three underlying patents
I For a thorough discussion of the UNCTAD Code see J. Palmer and R. Aiello, International
Technology Exchange: An Economic Analysis of Legal Proposals (Paper prepared for the Royal
Commission of the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada).
2 Id. at 29.
3 Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-23, § 29 (1970).
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had expired).4
The second case involved licenses granted by Union Carbide for a
patented process which facilitated printing on polyethylene sheets. The
Director of Investigation alleged that a number of provisions included:
(a) royalty rates which decreased with volume; (b) field of use restrictions
forbidding licensees from printing on sheets thicker than stipulated by
Union Carbide; (c) a no challenge clause restricting licensees from chal-
lenging the validity of the underlying patent and; (d) a provision that the
terms of the licenses continue to hold after the expiry of the patent. The
apparent basis of the Director's objection to these clauses was not that
they were offensive but that they discriminated among competing licen-
sees. Under the terms of the settlement the volume related royalty rates,
the field of use restrictions, the extension of license restrictions beyond
the term of the patent and the challenge clause were eliminated by Union
Carbide.5
Most observers agree that these two settlements provide relatively
little insight as to the nature of the license arrangements which might be
expected to contravene Canadian competition law.6 It can be argued
that either because they have been upheld by Canadian courts or have
not been challenged, many restrictive clauses which have been prohibited
elsewhere are allowable in Canada.
Among the examples that might be cited are, first, no challenge
clauses (licensee estoppel). These clauses continue to be upheld in Cana-
dian courts although they have been unenforceable in the United States
since 1969. 7
Second, tying arrangements and package licensing are, under most
circumstances, illegal both in the United States and in the European Eco-
nomic Community.8 In Canada, tying arrangements have been a review-
able practice under § 31.4 of the Combines Investigation Act since 1976.
One prohibition order has been issued since that time which did not in-
volve a licensing arrangement. 9 It is unlikely that any tie that did not
result in a significant foreclosure of the market for the tied product
would be seen as a violation under the terms of § 31.4.
Third, while European and United States law relating to tie-outs
4 Szibbo, The Canadian Antitrust Interface with Technology Agreements, 1985 Tech. Agree-
ments 4.2.06 (Materials prepared for a Continuing Legal Education Seminar, Vancouver, B.C.);
DEP'T OF CONSUMER AND CORP. AFFAIRS, REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF INVESTIGATION AND
RESEARCH, COMBINES INVESTIGATION ACT 29 (Ottawa, 1970), [hereinafter, REPORT OF THE DI-
RECTOR OF INVESTIGATIONS AND RESEARCH.]
5 Szibbo, supra note 4, at 4.2.06.
6 Id.
7 H. Fox, THE CANADIAN LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO LETTERS PATENT FOR INVEN-
TIONS, 318-23 (4th ed., 1969); French, The Basics of Licensing Agreements, Tech. Agreements.
FIKENTSCHER, THE DRAFT INT'L CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY (1981)
at 83.
8 Fikentscher, supra note 7, at 96-8.
9 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF INVESTIGATIONS AND RESEARCH, supra note 4, at 51-54.
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(restrictions on the use of competing technologies) is not clear cut, one
scholar assesses the approach in these jurisdictions as one of forbidding
tie-outs in general, and allowing them in particular cases where they can
be shown to be beneficial to the market.1 In Canada, tie-outs would
again be covered as a reviewable practice (exclusive dealing) under
§ 31.4. One case involving an exclusive dealing clause in a franchise con-
tract has been reviewed under this section since 1976.1 This arrange-
ment was found to be acceptable. Any tie-out that does not significantly
foreclose the market to other potential licensors would probably also be
acceptable.
More examples could be provided. The essential point is that tech-
nology licensors have had a relatively free hand in Canada. The question
remains as to whether this is appropriate. Economic analysis starts from
the proposition that most features of a contractual arrangement are for
the mutual benefit of the contracting parties. Prohibition of some provi-
sions such as grantbacks or market restrictions could result in their re-
placement by other terms, such as high royalties, which licensees might
find more burdensome. Of course, many jurisdictions would also forbid
this type of substitution leaving the licensor with a choice of either a
reduced yield or no transaction. Whether this expropriation of foreign
licensors' rents is also in the long-term national interest will be discussed
at the end of this section.
As is the case in a number of other jurisdictions, Canadian patent
law provides for compulsory licenses of patents which have not been
worked domestically.12 Opinion is divided as to whether "use it or lose
it" requirements are potentially beneficial to technology importing coun-
tries. The view that prevails among economists is that the patentee has
an interest in working the patent in the lowest cost locations. Forcing
high cost local exploitation is not in the national interest, unless there is a
significant learning effect which is not taken into account in the loca-
tional decision. Even here there are generally better ways to induce pat-
entees to take account of the skills and experience imparted to domestic
workers and firms as a consequence of local working. Of course the ex-
cess cost of local working may be borne entirely by the patentee. In this
case a local working requirement is simply another means of expropriat-
ing the patentee's rents. The merits of this strategy are discussed at the
end of this section.
Compulsory licenses for local working have not been widely used in
Canada or anywhere else. In Canada there have been approximately 90
10 Fikentscher, supra note 7, at 86.
11 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF INVESTIGATIONS AND RESEARCH, supra note 4 at 12-13.
12 Patent Act, R.S.C., ch P-4 § 67 (1970). Other countries with "use it or lose it" provisions
are France, Switzerland, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom. See Palmer and Aiello, supra
note 1, at 11, and THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON THE PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY 4 (1985) [hereinafter REPORT ON THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY].
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applications for licenses under § 67, and 11 have been awarded.1 3
The principal limitation on the use of compulsory licenses is that the
patentee cannot be obliged to provide licensees with the ancillary techno-
logical information necessary to work the patent. This limits the use of
these licenses to fields in which most of the requisite production informa-
tion is revealed in the patent. According to recent studies, these condi-
tions do not generally prevail in fields other than organic chemicals and
simple mechanical equipment. 14
Canadian patent law has also provided for compulsory licenses for
domestic manufacturing of pharmaceuticals using patented processes
since 1923. Between 1935 and 1969, 22 such licenses were issued. 5
In 1969, the Patent Act was amended to allow for compulsory
licenses to import pharmaceuticals made under patent processes. 16 As of
January 1985, 306 such licenses had been granted, although perhaps only
one-third of these are actually being used.17 The patentee receives a roy-
alty of 4% of the net selling price of the drug in its final dosage form.' 8
It is estimated that the price reductions which have resulted from
compulsory licensing, together with the imposition by provincial govern-
ments of mandatory substitution rules which effectively require pharma-
cists to dispense the lowest priced brand, saved Canadian consumers in
excess of $211 million in 1983.19 A significant generic pharmaceutical
industry has also developed in Canada.20
The generic producers typically import their active ingredients from
countries with weak patent protection such as Israel, Hungary or Brazil.
To a considerable extent they free ride on the research, development,
testing and other regulatory compliance expenditures of the patentee.
A Commission of Inquiry concluded in 1985 that the period of ex-
clusivity allowed and the royalties awarded the patentee under the pres-
ent system of compulsory licensing are both inadequate. The
Commission recommended a four year period of exclusivity during
which no compulsory licenses could be issued and a 14% royalty rate.
The full 14% would be received, however, only if the patentee's Cana-
dian R&D intensity was equal to the industry average.2'
The government has not yet acted on these recommendations. If
they were to be adopted, Canadians would effectively be paying apro rata
13 REPORT ON THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, supra, note 12 at 4.
14 R. Levin, A New Look at the Patent System (Dept. of Econ., Yale University 1985) (unpub-
lished manuscript).
15 REPORT ON THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, supra, note 12 at 4.
16 Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 41(4) (1970).
17 p. Gorecki, The Importance of Being First, 5 (Economic Council of Canada 1985) (unpub-
lished manuscript).
18 REPORT ON THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, supra, note 12, at 1-2.
19 Id. at 315-16.
20 Id. at 157-58. See also Gorecki, supra note 17, at 4-9.
21 Id. at xx-xxi.
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share of the worldwide research and development costs of the pharma-
ceutical industry. About $31 million of the $211 million savings attrib-
uted to compulsory licensing in 1983 would be transferred back to the
patentees.22
The question remains as to whether compulsory licensing, altered as
the Commission has suggested, is in Canada's long-term national inter-
est. Arguments to the effect that it will delay introduction of new drugs
in Canada, discourage domestic R&D or cause the collapse of the inter-
national patent system are not persuasive. Its principal disavantage lies
in the possibility that it will provoke retaliation. As a major trading na-
tion Canada is vulnerable to retaliation on many fronts. The United
States will surely insist that compulsory licensing be "on the table" in
any bilateral trade negotiations.
Alternatives to compulsory licensing which are less aggravating to
Canada's trading partners may exist. There may be merit in seeking
them out in that a return to the situation which existed prior to 1969 may
not be particularly palatable to Canadians. As citizens of a developed
country, Canadians may be prepared to bear a disproportionate share of
the worldwide R&D costs of the pharmaceuticals industry; that is, to pay
higher prices than do residents of less developed countries. It is less clear
that Canadians would or should adhere to a system under which they are
obliged to pay higher prices than those prevailing in other developed
countries.
In the absence of compulsory licensing, prices of patent
pharmaceuticals might be kept at levels prevailing in western Europe by
the more active use of § 67 of the Patent Act. This would involve defin-
ing the charging of prices significantly in excess of those prevailing in
Australia or western Europe, as an abuse of the patent. An alternative is
to stipulate that the importation of patented items into Canada from a
non-infringing foreign source does not constitute an infringement of the
Canadian patent. The parallel importation facilitated by this exhaustion
of the patent right after the first sale of the patented item might also help
to keep Canadian prices in line with other developed countries.23
III. INTERVENTION IN THE NEGOTIATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ARRANGEMENTS
Most national governments exercise some form of control over local
investment by foreigners. This control may take the form of closing cer-
tain "key" sectors to foreign investment. Often it is associated with the
existence of foreign exchange control. In some cases it involves reviewing
or screening foreign investments in an attempt to secure greater national
22 REPORT ON THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, supra, note 12, at xx-xxi.
23 For a discussion of the concept of exhaustion and its uses see DEP'T OF CONSUMER AND
CORP. AFFAIRS, PAPER ON PATENT LAW REVISION 141-42 (Ottawa, 1970).
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economic advantage.24 The latter is generally interpreted as involving a
greater amount of domestic value-adding activity.
Among the developed countries which have screened foreign invest-
ment on a systematic basis are Australia, Canada, France, Japan and
Sweden. The Canadian review process has involved the extraction of
commitments from foreign investors regarding employment levels, sourc-
ing of material inputs, access to foreign markets, investment in plant and
equipment, domestic R&D and domestic equity participation.
As a condition for the approval of their investments some investors
have agreed to import new technologies to Canada while others have
undertaken to increase local R&D activity. The public record contains
three examples which may be illustrative. First, in order to secure ap-
proval of its acquisition of Peoples Department Stores, the British firm
Marks and Spencer agreed, among other things, to use its textile technol-
ogy and industrial management expertise in the development of Cana-
dian-made St. Michael (a Marks and Spencer brand) merchandise, and to
spend at least $100,000 annually for three years on Canadian research
and development in textile and clothing technology.25
Second, the acquisition of Nacan Products Limited by the British
firm Unilever involved a commitment by the latter to the Foreign Invest-
ment Review Agency to ".... create a new Canadian research facility in
Ontario which will be the focal point for research within Unilever in
certain areas of particular interest to Canada."2 6
Third, approval of the acquisition by Datapoint Corporation of San
Antonio of a business carried on by TRW Canada was conditional upon
(among many other things) the commitment by the former to "its own
research and development program and to expend in each of the first five
years, a percentage of the CBE's (Canadian business enterprise's) gross
revenues generated in Canada on application software research and de-
velopment (a percentage greater than that expended by the applicant in
the USA) and to employ between three and six individuals dedicated to
software development."27
A number of questions have been raised regarding the benefits ob-
tained by this type of intervention. These include:
- Are investors actually induced to engage in domestic activities
they would not otherwise contemplate?
- Are the resources used in these additional activities drawn from
24 Discussions of alternative techniques of control and their international incidence can be
found in A. SAFARIAN, GOVERNMENTS AND MULTINATIONALS: POLICIES IN THE DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES (British North American Committee 1983) and U.S. Dep't of Commerce, THE USE OF
INVESTMENT INCENTIVES AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS (Of-
fice of Int'l Investment 1981).
25 Byron, The Canadian Experience of Marks and Spencer, 1978 FOREIGN INVESTMENT REV.
1, 4-6 (Summer).
26 SAFARIAN, supra note 24, at 101.
27 Id. at 101-02.
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lower valued uses (i.e., is employment "created" or merely
redistributed)?
- Is the cost of fulfilling commitments to the Foreign Investment
Reveiw Agency substracted from the price foreigners are willing to pay
for Canadian assets or is it borne by the foreign investors?
- To the extent that the cost of fulfilling commitments to FIRA is
borne by foreign investors, to what extent will it either discourage invest-
ment and rationalization or invoke retaliation?
The answers to the first three if not all of these questions are now
known. There have been some individual cases documented in which the
intervention of the Foreign Investment Review Agency was clearly
counter-productive. Crookell's description of the consequences of inter-
vention by FIRA in the major appliance industry is particularly illustra-
tive. It had the effect of forcing the sale of at least one firm to an
inappropriate, albeit Canadian, buyer. It frustrated the rationalization
process and, ironically, did not ultimately increase Canadian
ownership.28
Perhaps perceiving that the costs of screening individual foreign in-
vestments exceed the benefits, the government of Canada has recently
reduced the scope of its investment screening activities. Under the In-
vestment Canada Act, investments in new businesses are no longer re-
viewable. Acquisitions of Canadian businesses which are already
foreign-controlled are no longer reviewable if the value of the Canadian
business is either less than $50 million or less than 50% of the value of
the transaction.29
Canada has never reviewed technology transactions that have not
involved the acquisition of control by foreigners. This type of review is
common in less developed countries and has been practiced in Japan es-
pecially before 1970.30 Its purpose is generally to secure more favorable
terms and/or a larger role for the domestic participant. Specifically, this
often involves securing lower royalty rates, shorter agreements and fewer
export or sourcing restrictions for domestic licensees.
The general experience with this type of intervention appears to be
that while it is sometimes ineffective in that licensors can extract com-
pensation in forms not subject to control and it sometimes discourages or
postpones transfers, it can be effective in decreasing the rents accruing to
foreign licensors and in changing the transfer arrangement to increase
28 Crookell, The Impact of Government Intervention on the Major Appliance Industry in Can-
ada in CANADIAN INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN ACTION 490-574 (D. McFetridge ed. 1985); See also J.
Teece, THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION AND THE RESOURCE COST OF INTERNATIONAL
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 104 (1976). (Multinationals that take on a local partner can increase the
cost of technology transfer).
29 Investment Canada Act, R.S.C., ch. 20, § 14 (1970).
30 F. CONTRACTOR, INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY LICENSING 3-9 (1981) and Peck &
Tamura, Technology, in ASIA'S NEW GIANT: How THE JAPANESE ECONOMY WORKS 529-672 (H.
Patrick & H. Rosovsky eds. 1976).
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domestic participation."1
An important qualification to this conclusion is that government in-
tervention on behalf of domestic licensees tends to be most effective in
cases involving mature, well-known technologies with alternative suppli-
ers, and where the domestic market itself is attractive.32 As a small
country interested in the latest technologies, Canada might have signifi-
cantly less leverage.
To summarize, since 1973, Canada has reviewed foreign direct in-
vestment proposals and has, in some cases, required foreign investors to
make certain commitments with respect to technology imports and, ap-
parently more often, domestic R&D. The productivity of this interven-
tion is open to question, particularly in the light of the speed with which
circumstances change and decisions must be made in technology-ori-
ented sectors. In any event Canada began to move away from this ap-
proach in 1985. There has been no intervention in the negotiation of
individual technology transactions and none is seriously contemplated.
IV. SUBSIDIZATION OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND
RELATED ACTIVITIES
Government intervention in the technology transfer process can also
take the form of subsidizing either the acquisition of technology from
abroad or related activities.
A number of national governments subsidize, directly or indirectly,
the collection and local dissemination of information regarding techno-
logical developments abroad. Germany makes use of science counsellors
and commercial attaches at its foreign embassies, as well as its Society for
Information and Documentation which was set up in 1978 for this
purpose.33
In France the two government agencies responsible for the domestic
diffusion of foreign technologies are the Agence Nationale de la Valoriza-
tion de la Recherche and the Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scien-
tifique. These two agencies, particularly the latter, station
representatives abroad and maintain a continuing liason with domestic
firms. A technological databank is also maintained and assistance is pro-
vided in establishing links with foreign firms.34
Japan's national technology acquisition efforts has been widely doc-
umented. 35 It is managed by the Agency of Industrial Science and Tech-
31 Id. at 94-96; Reynolds, The Pinched Shoe Effect of International Joint Ventures, 1984
COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 19, 23-29 (Summer).
32 F. CONTRACTOR, supra note 30, at 95; Reynolds, supra note 31, at 24.
33 ONTARIO MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY AND TRADE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER MECHANISMS:
AN INT'L PERSPECTIVE 26-27 (1984) (A Background Research Report prepared for the Innovation
and Technology Div.).
34 Id. at 29-31 and Report of the Royal Comm'n on the Economic Union and Development
Prospects in Canada 161-67 (1985) [hereinafter Royal Comm'n].
35 Peck & Tamura, supra note 30.
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nology which has been involved in virtually all aspects of the technology
transfer process and has served as a model for the technology acquisition
efforts of such emerging industrial powers as Korea.36
In Canada, the National Research Council assists domestic firms in
acquiring new technologies through its Industrial Research Assistance
Program (IRAP) and its Technical Information Service. During 1984, a
field staff of 121 technology advisors was employed and 2540 projects
were supported. 37 The National Research Council also maintains a sci-
ence and technology databank (Canada Institute for Scientific and Tech-
nical Information, CISTI) which is the busiest lending library in Canada.
Some 50% of the requests for information come from the business
sector.38
The federal and provincial governments support numerous other in-
stitutions dedicated to the diffusion of new technology to Canadian busi-
ness. The Nielsen Task Force counted 330 technology centres in
operation in Canada in 1985 and concluded that this represented an
enormous duplication of service.39 The Canadian Manufacturers Associ-
ation which presumably represents the beneficiaries of these technology
centres, recently argued that the problem faced by its members is not a
lack of awareness of new technologies but an inability to finance their
acquisition. Technology centres do not, in its view, serve industry's
needs so much as they serve political needs.4
It has long been asserted that information had special properties
which justified government involvement in its collection and dissemina-
tion. It is difficult to induce individuals to pay for information the pre-
cise nature of which has not been revealed. It is also difficult to require
individuals to pay for information once it has been revealed. In addition,
information can be "re-used" so that the incremental cost of broader dif-
fusion is low relative to the cost of collection. This presents some
problems in designing and enforcing a pricing system. These problems
are far from insurmountable and it is not necessarily the case that a tech-
nological information system must run at a loss, or that government in-
volvement is essential over the longer term. In this regard
recommendations in favor of fewer technology centres and a greater de-
gree of cost recovery seem well-taken.
Governments also subsidize the technology acquisition activities of
firms. This may occur in a number of ways. First, R&D expenditures
may be subsidized and/or treated relatively favorably for tax purposes.
36 Royal Comm'n, supra note 34, at 166.
37 Id. at 95.
38 TASK FORCE ON PROGRAM REVIEW, SERVICES AND SUBSIDIES TO BUSINESS 469-73
(1986). (Available from Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa).
39 Id. at 418-21.
40 Canadian Manufacturer's Ass'n, Improving Our Industrial Competitiveness: A Science Pol-
icy for Canada 11-12 (1986) (unpublished manuscript).
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This is certainly true in Canada.41 Since the R&D cost of innovations
based on externally acquired technology amounts, on average, to approx-
imately 45% of the cost of the project, the subsidization of R&D indi-
rectly subsidizes technology acquisition. Since the R&D component of
innovations based on technology developed in-house amounts, on aver-
age, to 63% of project cost, the subsidization of R&D may bias firms
toward "reinventing the wheel"; that is, developing new technologies in-
ternally when they could be acquired more cheaply (on a before-tax ba-
sis) off the shelf.42
Second, capital investment may be subsidized and/or treated rela-
tively favorable for tax purposes. To the extent that new capital invest-
ment embodies the latest technological developments, the subsidization
of investment indirectly subsidizes technology acquisition.
In Canada, capital costs are treated more favorable than labor costs
for tax purposes.43 As a consequence firms may be induced to use rela-
tively more capital and, perhaps, to replace it more quickly than would
otherwise be the case. Capital costs are treated less favorably for tax
purposes than R&D costs. This could induce some firms to substitute
technological improvement based on inhouse R&D for those embodied
in new capital goods.' Again, this substitution would not be cost-effec-
tive on a before-tax basis.
Third, industrial development subsidy programs may have compo-
nents which are oriented primarily to technology acquisition. One exam-
ple is the program of modernization grants administered by the Canadian
Industrial Renewal Board (CIRB). These grants were intended to facili-
tate the acquisition of the latest technologies by firms in the textile cloth-
ing and footwear industries.45
A second example is the Machinery Duty Remission Program ad-
ministered by the Department of Regional Industrial Expansion (DRIE).
This program provides for remission of import duties on machinery not
produced in Canada. While this program facilitates acquisition of new
foreign technologies embodied in imported machinery, it is motivated
principally by Canadian obligations regarding average tariff rates (in-
cluding remissions) under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade.46
A third example is the modernization component of the Industrial
and Regional Development Program (IRDP) administered by DRIE.
41 D. MCFETRIDGE & J. WARDS, CANADIAN R&D INCENTIVES: THEIR ADEQUACY AND
THEIR IMPACT (1983).
42 McFetridge & Corvari, Technology Diffusion: 4 Survey of Canadian Evidence and Public
Policy Issues in TECHNOLOGY CHANGE IN CANADIAN INDUSTRY 216-17 (D. McFetridge ed. 1985).
43 The recently announced repeal of the Investment Tax Credit will reduce this difference. See
DEP'T OF FINANCE BUDGET PAPERS 28-30 (Feb. 26, 1986).
44 D. MCFETRIDGE & J. WARDS, supra note 41, at 42-44.
45 TASK FORCE ON PROGRAM REVIEW, supra note 38, at 139-43.
46 Id. at 122-27.
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This program provides subsidies for the modernization and expansion of
existing manufacturing and processing operation.47 Technology acquisi-
tion is also facilitated on occasion by IRDP subsidies to new plants. The
$275 million subsidy provided to Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. to induce
it to manufacture helicopters at Mirable, Quebec is a case in point. A
substantial fraction of this subsidy is thought to be a payment for existing
Bell technology.48
Industrial development subsidies of a similar nature are found in
many other developed economics.49 Whether Canada should maintain
the array of programs it has in place is another question. The Nielsen
Task Force has recently recommended that expenditures in this area be
reduced. ° Moreover these subsidies are also likely to be "on the table"
when trade liberalization between the United States and Canada is
discussed.
On the conceptual level the question is whether, left to themselves,
individual firms will acquire too little new technology too slowly from a
social point of view. While there may be a rationale for the subsidization
of information collection and discrimination, the argument for subsi-
dizing firms to act on this information is less persuasive. One recent
study concludes that, if faced with a choice between the subsidization of
domestic R&D and the subsidization of technology transfer, public pol-
icy should tilt in the direction of the former.51 Others argue that so-
called modernization subsidies will continue to have a rationale as com-
pensation to the victims of trade liberalization. According to this view,
subsidies of this nature are necessary to placate political opposition to
trade liberalization. They are efficient in the sense that, without them,
the broad efficiency gains resulting from trade liberalization could not be
realized.
V. TRADE AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER5 2
It has been argued that, by international standards, Canadian firms
are slow in adopting new technologies. The source of this diffusion lag is
thought to lie in the relatively small size of the Canadian market and in
the lack of domestic competition. According to this view, Canadian
firms are too small to take advantage of the latest technologies and are, in
any case, under no competitive pressure to introduce them. Existing evi-
dence provides some, but by no means conclusive, support for this view.
To the extent that the problem is one of scale and competition, trade
47 Id. at 104-12.
48 McQuaig, Taxpayers Bear Much of Risk in Bell Helicopter Venture, The Globe and Mail
Report on Bus., Jan. 31, 1985.
49 Office of Int'l Inv., U.S. Dep't of Commerce supra, note 24, Table 1.
50 TASK FORCE ON PROGRAM REVIEW, supra, note 38, at 109-11.
51 R. HARRIS, TRADE INDUS. POLICY AND INT'L COMPETITION 107-09 (1985).
52 For a more extensive discussion of this issue, along with references, see McFetridge &
Corvari, supra note 42, at 217-24.
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liberalization provides a solution. The expectation is that trade liberali-
zation will result in both more competion and a rationalization of pro-
duction in domestic markets. Canadian producers will be more
specialized but will, of necessity, operate at world scale. They will thus
be in a position to adopt the latest production technologies as they be-
come available.
These "dynamic benefits" of freer trade are largely hypothetical
although they do have an intuitive appeal. They are often adduced in
support of proposals for trade liberalization.
VI. CONCLUSION
Four sets of public policies relating to international technology
transfer have been discussed in this paper. They are:
- alteration of the scope and duration of domestic intellectual
property rights;
- participation in the negotiation of technology transfer
arrangements;
- subsidization of technology transfer and activities relating
thereto;
- alteration of the competitive environment and the structure of
domestic industry.
With the exception of pharmaceuticals, the protection accorded
owners of intellectual property in Canada is relatively strong. Canada
has benefitted from the compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical patents,
but this benefit has come at the expense of foreign patentees and is un-
likely to be sustainable in the light of international pressure.
To the extent that the acquisition or formation of a Canadian busi-
ness by foreigners has involved at least a potential technology transfer,
the government of Canada has involved itself in the negotiation of tech-
nology transfer arrangements. This practice has been of dubious benefit
to Canada, and has been curtailed significantly in the recent amendments
to the foreign investment review legislation.
Canada, like most other countries, subsidizes the collection and do-
mestic dissemination of international technology intelligence. Recent
years have seen a considerable expansion of the Canadian effort in this
field. Questions have been raised to the effect that both the magnitude of
the effort and the subsidy involved are excessive. Canada also subsidizes
the technology acquisition activities of firms, though generally in an indi-
rect way. To the extent that this subsidization is associated either with
the support of domestic R&D or payments to victims of trade liberaliza-
tion, there appears to be a continuing justification for it.
It has been suggested that more timely domestic adoption of new
foreign technologies would be a consequence of trade liberalization. This
proposition has been among the arguments adduced in favor of recent
Canadian efforts in this direction.
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Although the situation is not without ambiguity, it can be concluded
that the nature of Canadian public policies toward technology transfer
has changed in recent years. There is less emphasis on participation in
individual transfers or sets of transfers, and more emphasis on the main-
tenance of a general economic framework conductive to technology
transfer. This change in emphasis is to be commended.
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